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# Introduction

Twenty three essays constitute this anthology which can be divided into two kinds: first, essays which aim at explicating the meaning of Wittgensteinian concepts, and second, essays which use them as a tool to explore, examine, and understand further philosophical developments. These two parts of the book mutually complement each other as former provides the background for the latter. Here an attempt has been made to include the issues which have often been occurred in India during recent debates and discussions in the area of Wittgensteinian philosophy, theology, logic, ethics, religion, social science, culture studies, psychology and linguistics.

Professor R. C. Pradhan's essay, "Re-reading Wittgenstein: Problems and Prospects", which explores various dimensions of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, has been placed at the top in order to act as a foundation to the anthology. Pradhan has claimed that Wittgenstein's philosophy being rich and multi-faceted cannot be put into any strait-jacket. It is open to multiple interpretations from realism to idealism, from naturalism to transcendentalism and from modernism to post-modernism. Wittgenstein seems to be open to the ideas from all traditions with which he has been acquainted. In that sense, he does not belong to any school of philosophy; he is a philosopher of philosophers. Wittgenstein has always been an eternal explorer, a nomadic in the field of thought. That is the reason why he has explored without any bias and prejudice of thought, language and reality covering the entire domain of man's encounter with Being. This essay resists any attempt to freeze Wittgenstein's thought within the narrow confines of sectarian philosophy and the outmoded styles of interpreting philosophy.

Professor Pradhan's essay sets the general background of the issues discussed in the anthology and the next four essays deal with Wittgenstein's thoughts on Logic: the first on Wittgenstein's 'Notes on Logic', the second on Wittgenstein on Induction, the third on the logical representation of the world, and the fourth on Early Wittgenstein as a critique of Russellian logic in particular and logical representation in general. The "Notes on Logic" is regarded as the first philosophical issue with which Wittgenstein engaged himself. Professor K. C. Pandey in his essay "On Potter's Interpretation of 'Meaning' and 'Sense' in Wittgenstein's 'Notes on Logic'" has interpreted the notions of 'meaning' (*Bedeutung*) and 'sense' (*Sinn*) as described in Micheal Potter's insightful work *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*. He has shown that the value of this book had already been outlined in the publication of its book reviews

that had specifically established that Wittgenstein's "Notes on Logic" was an independent and primordial work which acted as a catalyst at least to "Notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway [1914]", *Notebooks 1914-16*, and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. After analysing the positions of Frege and Russell on the notions of 'meaning' and 'sense', this essay brings out Wittgensteinian perspective as well as expositions of Potter's interpretations on multiple issues.

The next essay "Wittgenstein's view on Empirical Reasoning and Induction" on the issue of Wittgenstein on logic belongs to Professor S. Shyamkishore Singh. According to him, Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on induction in *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* throw light on the nature of empirical reasoning and probability relations between the events. For Singh, Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* has maintained that the so called law of induction cannot be a law of logic. It is so because it is not possible to infer the existence of one situation from the existence of another situation, because there is no casual nexus between them. (*TLP*, 5.135, 5.136). Regarding the 'uniformity of nature', Wittgenstein has held that we have no ground for such a hypothesis in the light of which we may make predictions about the future from past experiences. Further, Singh has investigated that Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, has maintained that one cannot justify a conclusion on the ground that the something has been found to pay (*PI*, 467) as any attempt to justify in this manner would be circular. Experience provides grounds for predictions. But a good ground makes the occurrence of the event only probable. On the justification of induction Wittgenstein observed that our day to day regular reactions to the contingent happenings around us constitute the framework within which we learn to give reasons for doing and believing. He has placed it within the framework of our language games, and not within the fold of any deductive reasoning. Wittgenstein, however, admitted the importance of induction from the pragmatic standpoint.

Next, Professor Tafajol Hossain has claimed that Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* has held that there is a logical correspondence between world of facts and language. That means, language is used as a means of representation. Wittgenstein explains his theory of representation with the help of his doctrine of language and that of the world as there is a representing (picturing) relation between language and reality, which is the totality of state of affairs. Only the elementary propositions directly picture (represent) the reality. Now the question is: how does an elementary proposition represent a state of affairs? Following Wittgenstein, it may be said that an elementary proposition, being a model of a state of affairs, pictures (represents) it. To give an exposition to Wittgenstein's theory of representation, Hossain tries to explain the notions of 'world', 'language' and 'representing (picturing) relation between them' in the three sections of essay "Wittgenstein's Theory of Representation: An Exposition."

Mr. Siddique Alam Beg in his essay "Sense, Form, and Representation: Rejection of Ontological Hierarchy in early Wittgenstein" has maintained that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* led old logic of Frege-Russell tradition to a new direction. Russell, like Frege, interprets logic in a universalistic

way. In this approach, logical notions, such as variables, quantifiers, form of proposition, logical connectives have been described as unrestricted generality applicable to their respective individual entities. For example quantifiers  $(x)$ ,  $(\exists y)$  are generalizable over the individual names  $a, b, c$  etc. as their entities. This approach of explaining logic in universalistic way leads Russell (as well as Frege) to some uneasy ontological crises. The most important among these is that the universalism gives rise to some self-referential paradoxes, e.g. set theoretic paradox, liar paradox. To prevent from these logical absurdities, Russell has offered different explanation of his universalism over the period, and finally he proposed the celebrated theory of types, and later on ramified form of it. Russell says that entities of world and consequently the symbols for them are internally stratified-- there are distinctions of types as well as level between them. So the meaning of symbol cannot cover itself. No meaning of a symbol is applicable to the symbol itself. Such an ontological settlement can easily dispose of the vicious self-reference sentences. Again, to avoid ontological over crowding, Russell had to propose that the hierarchy as explained in the theory of types is applicable neither to the entities of the real world, nor to the propositions, rather to the judgments we make about the facts. Russell then goes on to fabricate the way in which a judgment can provide the requirement of truth or falsity condition of the respective proposition. Thus we have another theory: the multiple relation of judgment theory. Wittgenstein clearly shows his discomfort to the universalism in his early correspondence with Russell. His rejection of universalism amounts to deny the possibility of ontological hierarchy in any form. Wittgenstein in his early writings, especially in *Tractatus* and *Notes on Logic*, criticised both of above theories which had laid the foundation of Russellian universalism. Mr. Siddique in his paper attempts to focus on two points: firstly, Wittgenstein's criticism of Russellian universalism that possibly gives rise to the uncomfortable ontological hierarchy; and secondly, how the *Tractarian* exposition of the nature of logic can provide a better alternative to universalism.

Wittgenstein himself had realised that his thesis about the picturing relation between language and reality is not without constrains and therefore emphasized on use theory of meaning. However, there are critics of this theory as well. Thus, Professor Jagat Pal in his essay "Wittgenstein's Treatment of Word-meaning in the *Philosophical Investigations*" tries to establish through the analysis and arguments that Wittgenstein's treatment of word-meaning is not satisfactory because he held inconsistent views about it and confounded the notion of use with the notion of correct use.

Likewise, Dr. Lalruatfela's essay "Wittgenstein and Language-games" contains a brief account of the arguments put forward by Daniel Whiting in "Language, Language-Games and Forms of Life" in Blackwell companion to Wittgenstein against the interpretation of Wittgenstein as a contextualist. This essay may be regarded as an extension to the arguments of Whiting. It stresses on the nature of language as a natural process which is beyond the control of a human being. According to Lalruatfela, the main point of Wittgenstein's view is that language and human forms of life are mysteries.

Further, Professor P.K. Pokker's essay "Language game and multi-culture: From Wittgenstein to Postmodernism" focuses on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and tries to reveal how Wittgenstein constructs the visual aspect of linguistic signs. The conclusion of the basic argument in the essay is that the postmodern linguistic approach had already been envisaged by Wittgenstein. Pokker holds that the visual aspect of linguistic sign and plurality of its interpretations are mutually linked, and hence, a multicultural approach could reveal new insight in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Dr. Ravindra KS Choudhary's concern with language-game is different from that of Lalruatfela and Pokker. His essay "Language-Games: Interdisciplinary Implications" shows that the Wittgensteinian concept leads to illuminating implications when applied to philosophical understanding of interdisciplinary implications. The complexities, diversities and dynamism involved in language games have been found to be particularly interesting in understanding the nature of dialogue among different knowledge domains; they also give vivid pictures of blurring disciplinary boundaries and constantly changing contours of interdisciplinary formations.

Philosophical problems pertaining to mutual connectedness of language games and rule following turn more serious when we have various interpretations of Wittgenstein's concept of following a rule. The issue of the multiplicity of the interpretations of the concept of rule following has been taken up by Dr. Mamata Manjari Panda. Her essay "Solitary Individual and Wittgenstein's Concept of Rule-Following" attempts to examine the question 'Can a solitary individual be a rule-follower?' from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The concept of rule following in relation to a solitary individual, that is examined here, is especially found in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. For Wittgenstein, rule-following is customary in the sense that to follow a rule means to act in accordance with communal practice and this practice as such follows training and regularity of use. In this context, the community view of Norman Malcolm and the regulatory view of P. M. S. Hacker and G. P. Baker have been discussed along with certain aspects of the major interpretations, such as that of Saul Kripke.

Professor P.R. Bhat extends the arguments of Dr. Mamata Manjari Panda and supports Wittgenstein in his essay, "Mental Predicates in Wittgenstein". P. R. Bhat holds the view that a philosopher needs to answer the sceptic, if the question raised is normal. However, if there is a mere logical possibility of doubt, then the sceptic need not be taken seriously. Further, according to Bhat, we need to use mental predicates to ascribe certain intentions to others, even if we do not know the truth conditions. We may go wrong occasionally, but still the cultural language as an institution does not fail. Life can go on with the language that we have even though language can be misused. The demand of sceptic is unreasonable, though Kripke gives credit to sceptic and thinks that Wittgenstein is giving sceptical answers to sceptical questions. In his reading of Wittgenstein, he believes that language is all right. It keeps everything open to be examined by everyone including the sceptic.

Dr. Navneet Chopra goes beyond the issue of rule following in his essay "Wittgenstein on Meaning: Explorations in the Light of Embodied Cognitive Science." He argues, as Wittgenstein proposes, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, that meaning of a word/ phrase/ expression is decided by the forms of life. But the problem is: what is the nature of the form of life; a collection of certain non-linguistic social-cultural practices, customs and value-systems commonly agreed upon in a community, or a collection of linguistic 'language-games' or grammars of the use of the words in practice? This raises certain questions. First, since he is somewhat vague on the issue (giving impressions of both at different instances), so what is the correct interpretation among these two? Second, what is more fundamental or prior agency among the two for deciding the meaning of a word (when we can see an obvious intertwined relationship between the two)? While pursuing semantic analysis of words/expressions in terms of rules and rule-following, Wittgenstein presents some difficulties in the practice of abstract, external or transcendental, private and rigid rule-following [ (against) Private Language Argument] and concedes that this rule-following can't be something external or transcendental and private, but is essentially internal to the community, and meaning is decided by the custom or communal agreement in a 'blind' manner. But he is not willing to ground the meaning of a word in the psychological states of the subjects (say, for the words 'anger' or 'pain', etc.) who might be the part of a community, rather he proposes that the meaning is grounded in the 'grammar of the use of the words'. This seems to be based on the skeptical notion of privacy of the inner sensations and the apparent inaccessibility of qualia of sensations of the others (and hence his famous Beetle in the Box Argument). Dr Chopra proposes that such Wittgensteinian worries can be answered using discoveries in 'embodied cognition' paradigm using studies in the modern cognitive-developmental psychology (imitation studies), cognitive neuroscience (mirror neuron theory), certain psycholinguistic experimental studies (e.g. by Glenberg on action-verb comprehension), and 'embodied' responses from Barsalau (Perceptual Symbol System theory) to the Symbol Grounding Problem raised by Harnad, without doing away with the inner ostension for deciding the meaning of the words/expressions.

Next two essays deal with the issues in the areas of private language. First, Dr. Ratikanta Panda, in his essay, "Is Private Language Possible? A Critical Study in *Philosophical Investigations*" claims that Wittgenstein's argument in *Philosophical Investigations* (Sec. 243–302) about the impossibility of a private language is a landmark development in Wittgenstein's thought in particular and in the philosophy of language in general. This argument has a major impact on the development of 20th century philosophy of language. Here, Wittgenstein's main concern is to reject the possibility of Private Language. There are many issues involved in the conception of a private language. It is basically a language, which the speaker develops to express his subjective and private feelings and experiences. The experiences are so personal and subjective that one is tempted to believe that the highly personalized and private language is necessary to express them. Thus, there is the idea of private experience underlying the idea of private language. Solipsists, subjectivists and the defenders of privacy of

experiences have always tended to believe that there is a private language, since there are private experiences. The essay is divided into two sections; section one explores the idea of a private language whereas section two rejects such a possibility on the ground that language and meaning are social and communitarian in nature.

Another essay "Is Private Language Possible: Wittgenstein's Response" by Dr. Laimayum Bishwanath Sharma attempts to delineate the concept of private language argument. For Sharma, the private language argument remains central in Wittgenstein's later philosophy in the context of his attack on Cartesianism. It is certainly the case that Wittgenstein's philosophy would never have a place in the contemporary analytic philosophical discourse without this argument. Wittgenstein's philosophical inquiry into the private language problem denounced a firm Cartesian belief that there is a dichotomy between private mental happenings and the body. Wittgenstein rightly observes that the private mental happening could not be proved by virtue of its language and experiences. So, the issues discussed by Panda and Sharma are different, although the titles of their essays have resemble. They have raised current contemporary issues of the Wittgensteinian private language argument.

After considering the issue of the privacy of experience and private language, we take up the issues of comparative points between Wittgenstein and phenomenology on the one hand and Wittgenstein and Moore on the other. Professor S. Panneerselvam's essay "Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Understanding of Language and its Implication on Continental Philosophy" discusses Wittgensteinian notion of 'understanding' in the context of Husserl's phenomenology. Panneerselvam claims that Wittgenstein in his writings makes it clear that the meaning of the word 'understand' can be learnt by seeing how the word is used in practice. Understanding, for him, is a phenomenon of learning and using our human language. Wittgenstein explains this by giving the example of a game. In phenomenology also language plays an important role. Husserl considers language as a reduction of thought. In the writings of Heidegger and Gadamer as well as Habermas, the significance of language has been emphasized. Another important convergent point of the two different traditions – Analytic and Continental - has been raised in the following way by Gadamer. Gadamer holds that normally it is said that phenomenology has its focus on transcendental philosophy whereas Anglo-Saxon philosophy is based on positivism. But a closer look at these traditions would show that such an apparent distinction is unfounded. Gadamer contends that in Wittgenstein, the problem of language is central from the very beginning, but it gains its full philosophical universality only as his thoughts mature.

Another essay which has adopted the comparative methodology belongs to Dr. Bhaskar Bhattacharyya. In his essay, "Ordinary Language Philosophy: Wittgenstein and Moore" he compares the similarities and differences in the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Moore. Bhaskar Bhattacharyya claims that if the affinity of the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* can be seen with the Russell of logical atomism, the same of the later Wittgenstein can be seen with Moore.



It may however sound odd to compare Wittgenstein with Moore, because the philosophical standpoints of the two philosophers are quite apart. While Moore is labelled as a common-sense philosopher, Wittgenstein is best known as an ordinary language analyst. Wittgenstein dealt with the question how is language used ordinarily. With his innovative conceptions of 'language games' and forms of life' Wittgenstein brought about a revolution in philosophy of language. But Moore was more interested in constructing metaphysics of the common sense in retaliation to Bradeleyan idealism. From one point of view, therefore, Moore may be called a metaphysician and Wittgenstein an anti-metaphysician. But despite these differences in their approaches both the philosophers have certain features in common which have been explored and critically discussed throughout this essay.

Next six essays raise Wittgensteinian issues pertaining to the life, culture, religion and rituals. Professor Bijoy H. Boruah in his essay "*Sub Specie Aeternitatis* The World of the Good Life" discusses the idea of absolute value in the context of human aspiration for living a good life. His discussion is grounded in a particular account of the metaphysics of the self in so far as this account is meant to explain the relation between the self and the good life. In this respect he presents an account of the metaphysics of the self to explain the relation between self and good life. He studies Wittgenstein's conception of good life in relation to the human self in *Notebooks* and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In order to provide the metaphysical entry into the heart of Wittgenstein's enigmatic and rather intriguing comments on the relation between the self and the good life he takes recourse to the 'metaphysics of the self' articulated by Thomas Nagel in his *The View from Nowhere*. To this end he suggests that we use a 'metaphysical window' through which we form a world view which is a 'view from nowhere', that is a view from the standpoint of eternity. Indeed, such a world view could be said to be a consequence of one's metaphysical commitment to absolute value—that is to say, commitment to the idea that values, if real in any sense, are real in the absolute sense.

Next, Professor K. Srinivas' essay is an attempt to show that *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is primarily an essay on transcendentalism. It maintains that as one goes deeper into the philosophical depths of *Tractatus* one notices the similarities between Wittgenstein with the Vedāntic transcendentalism as expounded in the Advaitic tradition.

Dr. Roitualiana Darlong's essay, "Wittgensteinian Interpretations of Language" explores the idea that for Wittgenstein meaning of life is vested in the kind of language we use. For Darlong, language usage can affect social, religious and communal communication and inter-personal relationships.

Further, Professor Kanti Lal Das' essay "Philosophy of Culture; A Later Wittgensteinian Account" engages in exploring the philosophical insight into the relationship between language and culture as found in later Wittgenstein. This essay holds that language gets its structure out of culture. Language reflects the culture of the community. Culture is the knowhow one has to acquire for leading a daily life. Wittgenstein anticipates various forms of life and also various

forms of culture. In a sense, the language of culture would be the language of humour. The strategy of this essay is to investigate as to whether cross-cultural communication or cultural integration is possible or not.

The notion of cultural integration or transcendent culture is closely connected with the idea of transcendental religion. This notion finds space in Dr. Ashoka Kumar Tarai's essay "Religion and Self: A Metaphysical Coherence in Wittgenstein's Philosophy". It discusses the methodological distinction between the transcendental and immanent sense of religion which are found in early and later Wittgenstein's writings respectively. Tarai argues that there is a need to go beyond the immanent notion of religion which in Wittgensteinian thoughts has been grounded in the popular understanding of language games. Finally, according to Tarai, both transcendental and immanent notions of religion in Wittgenstein's philosophy get dissolved into one form.

Unlike transcendental religion, immanent religion has a lot to do with rituals and Wittgenstein's "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" is a significant area in his philosophy of religion which Dr. Tarang Kapoor has chosen to deal with in her essay "Later Wittgenstein on Human Action: Understanding Ritual as a 'Performative.'" Here she discusses Peter Winch's well-known view in "The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy" about Wittgenstein and how it develops into the concept of cross-cultural understanding. She argues that it is wrongly presumed that the scientific explanation takes a position superior to understanding of rituals by the primitive people. Further, she holds that a ritual cannot be understood through a scientific explanation of the action as an explanation of the motive of the action has to be taken into account.

At the end, Mrs. Rumpa Chakraborty Beg's essay, "*Tractatus* and *Investigations*: Beyond the Contrast" throws light on a vexed controversy of Wittgenstein's philosophy. On the one hand, many Wittgensteinians tried to show the basic differences between the early and later phases of Wittgenstein's philosophy as they support the 'two Wittgensteins' viewpoint, on the other hand, some interpreters emphasise Wittgenstein's own remarks that his later philosophy could be seen in the right light only by contrast with, and against the background of, his old way of thinking. She reflects on the thesis that there is a continuity of thought from earlier *Tractatus* to later *Investigations*. She further discusses some thoughts from Wittgenstein's early writings which are continued or modified in *Investigations*. The most striking point for her is that language occupies central position in whole philosophic enterprise of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's task of limiting the language, as it was in *Tractatus*, remained same in the *Investigations*, although in a different form. In addition to these issues, according to the author, the issue of the notion of philosophy is a significant notion and Wittgenstein did not completely free his mind from his earlier conception of philosophy.

The distinctive feature of this anthology consists in raising new issues across various aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein which envisages the scope for fresh interpretations. It may be classified into eight sections of which first essay of R. C. Pradhan may be regarded as the foundation as it deals

with many issues and the last chapter of Rumpa Chakraborty Beg as the one which looks into the threads of the similarities of early and later Wittgenstein. It is clear that the chapter numbers two to five deal with Wittgenstein's view on Logic and the chapters six to nine are about various aspects of use theory of meaning and language-game. Next, chapters ten to twelve talk about rule following and beyond. Next two chapters - thirteen and fourteen - are about Wittgenstein's rejection of privacy and private language. Further, chapters fifteen and sixteen bring thoughts of phenomenology and Moore to explicate the issues of Wittgensteinian Philosophy. Next chapters seventeen to twenty two belong to various aspects of life, and culture.